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CONFLICT AND COALITION:
POLITICAL VARIABLES UNDERLYING
WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN
DEAN E. MANN*
The political boundaries of the Lake Powell region almost defy
definition. While the hydrology of the lake is limited by the river
system above the lake, and the ecology of the shoreline is necessarily
restricted to the land surface immediately surrounding the lake, the
political boundary most certainly includes people and institutions in
state capitals throughout the Southwest and in Washington, D.C. In a
broader inquiry concerning decisionmaking with respect to the entire
Colorado River system of which the Upper Basin is a part, the
boundary may stretch as far as Mexico City as well.
Furthermore, in seeking systematic explanations of political events
such as the decision to create Lake Powell with the passage of the
Colorado River Storage Project Act, it must be recognized that the
boundaries which presumably define the political system are highly
permeable, i.e., they are highly responsive to both unique and general
conditions that prevail in the surrounding political, economic, and
social environment. Thus, for example, a general, prevailing condition-low discount rates in evaluating benefits of water resource
projects-may have facilitated the passage of the Act; similarly, a
very specific circumstance-other legislators who wanted a St. Lawrence Seaway Project-may also have facilitated passage. While we
may come to a more or less acceptable and accepted explanation of
why events took place and results were achieved, we may find it
extremely difficult to predict what the results might have been had
these conditions been otherwise.
MODELS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS
Despite these caveats about providing systematic explanations concerning political behavior, it is nevertheless possible to provide an
explanation of the politics of Upper Colorado River Basin development as a manifestation of certain patterns of political behavior.
These patterns are founded in the proposition that substantive policy
is the crucial independent variable which largely determines the
manner in which the actors and the political institutions of American
society perform. That is to say, water resources policy issues have
*Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara.
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been handled in a distinctive way because of the expectations of the
various actors about the rewards that come from water policy.
The politics of the Colorado River Storage Project Act clearly
demonstrate the validity of a paradigm of American politics first
posited by Theodore Lowi. This paradigm distinguished among distributive, regulative, and redistributive politics.'
In its classical form, distributive politics involves a process of coalition-building among local interests hoping to achieve some benefit
from the public treasury. These local interests strive to achieve unity
on a basic legislative proposal by a process of bargaining and accomodation, thus removing any sources of conflict that will provide
opportunities for resistance at the higher levels of government. This
coalition then seeks to achieve its policy 'goals by extending its
bargaining effort outside the parameters of its own adherents by a
process familiarly known as "logrolling." The legislative output takes
the form of financial support for projects of interest to the various
localities. There is very little in the way of "policy" as an outcome
since each locality receives a benefit that is peculiar to itself. This
form of politics is further characterized by the relative lack of
confrontation between those who gain and those who lose as a result
of the adoption of the proposal. The taxpayers, who must pay the
bill, seldom have an effective voice in the political bargaining. The
principal actors in this political process tend to be local and state
interests and public agencies, federal bureaus and committees of
Congress.
Regulatory politics take on quite different characteristics. The
battles in regulatory politics tend to concern sectoral interests rather
than local interests. These sectoral interests might be and usually are
economic, but they may be aesthetic, religious, or fraternal. The
battles tend to be fought by national associations, and the issue is
public policy as well as specific project elements. The struggle is
more open because the winners and the losers are more obvious. The
implications for both producer and consumer cannot be so easily
hidden and the spokesmen for each side endeavor to broaden the
conflict in order to obtain allies. Principal actors, in addition to the
national associations, are the two houses of Congress rather than
their committees and occasionally the President. The resolution of
the conflict, after intense bargaining, may take the form of a victory
for one side or the other or some form of compromise. The output
1. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory, 16 World
Pol. 186 (1964); Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice, 32 Pub. Ad. Rev. 298
(1972).
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of this process is a policy which states the terms of the bargain
achieved and provides the baseline for future political combat.
The third form of politics is redistributive and concerns shifts in
the general incidence of benefits and burdens in society. The subjects
for redistributive politics tend to concern levels and rates of taxation,
tariffs, levels of public spending and welfare programs. Principal
participants in this process tend to be the President and both houses
of Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and major peak
associations such as the trade union federations and the national
Chamber of Commerce. It must be recognized that all forms of
politics have redistributive effects, but in redistributive politics the
principal focus of conflict concerns deliberate efforts to achieve
redistribution of the goods and services of society.
THE COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT
The politics of the Colorado River Storage Project involve both
distributive and regulatory politics. It is clear that the proponents of
the Project desired above all else to have the Project considered within the distributive framework because that framework provided the
maximum political leverage through the quiet accommodations that
have traditionally characterized water politics in the United States.
On the other hand, the inclusion of a project to construct a dam at
Echo Park within the Dinosaur National Monument led to a prolonged and highly visible political battle in which the proponents
found that they no longer had the necessary political resources with
which to achieve an accommodation.2
A. HistoricalContext
The context of the struggle is well known and requires little elaboration here. The Upper Basin states, at the conclusion of World War
II, were anxious to exercise their claims upon the waters of the
Colorado River system. They had obtained what was in effect a
promissory note for development in the Colorado River Compact of
1922' which was finally implemented through the Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1928.' This promissory note reserved to the Upper
Basin an average annual flow of 7.5 million acre-feet of water from
2. For extended treatments of this controversy, see 0. Stratton & P. Sorotkin, The Echo
Park Controversy (1959); see also R. Baird, The Politics of Echo Park and Other Development Projects in the Upper Colorado River Basin, 1960 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Illinois); R. Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (1967); E. Richardson, Dams, Parks
and Politics (1973).
3. Nov. 24, 1922, 70 Cong. Rec. 324 (1928).
4. 43 U.S.C. § § 617-617v (1970).
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the Colorado River. The Upper Basin had been growing more slowly
than Southern California, and this agreement therefore provided a
guarantee against almost complete appropriation by California of the
river system's water under the law of prior appropriation.
The Bureau of Reclamation provided the impetus for serious
consideration of Upper Basin development projects when in 1946 it
published its study, The ColoradoRiver.' This study did at least two
things: it catalogued possible development projects and made it clear
that there was not enough water to make all the projects feasible.
Moreover, the report made explicit the premise that no projects
would be developed in the Upper Basin unless the states of the Upper
Basin achieved an agreement concerning utilization of the waters of
the river in the Upper Basin.
B. Upper Basin Bargaining
Thus, the opportunity and impediment contained in the Bureau's
report were powerful stimuli to action in the Upper Basin. This
action took the form of creating an Upper Colorado Compact
Commission for purposes of writing an interstate compact. Over a
period of two years the commissioners engaged in intensive discussion and negotiation over different approaches to the allocation
problem. The Bureau of Reclamation was available to provide technical assistance as well as policy advice.6
Negotiations centered on the allocation of water but also on the
implications of reserved Indian rights and the specific manner in
which each state's interest might be realized. Colorado was especially
torn: it wanted very hard to get Upper Basin projects authorized and
was therefore willing to be flexible, but it also felt that Colorado
deserved a lion's share of the water since it produced about 70 percent of the water. The formula the commissioners arrived at in allocating Upper Basin water was the following:'

5. H.R. Doc. No. 419, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946).
6. For an excellent discussion of these negotiations, see J. Muys, Interstate Water Compacts: The Interstate Compact and Federal-Interstate Compact (Nat'l Water Comm'n Legal
Study No. 14, 1971). The ambivalent position of the Bureau was nicely stated by the
Commission's engineering adviser from the Bureau: "As an engineer, I would like to see all
the facts gathered. As a promoter and a member of the Bureau of Reclamation, I would like
to see the States come to a quick agreement, select a list of projects and give them to the
Secretary of the Interior and say, 'Mr. Secretary, we have agreed among ourselves we can
build these projects that will use up "x" amount of water, and we will not squabble up to
here. We can surely build these amounts of projects.' " Upper Colo. River Compact
Comm'n, 2 Official Record 22 (Meeting No. 5, Dec. 1-4, 1947).
7. Upper Colorado River Compact, art. III(a)(2), 63 Stat. 31, 33 (1949).
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Colorado
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Utah

23

New Mexico

11.25%

Wyoming

14
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Of particular importance was the issue of water for the Central Utah
project. With serious questions about the availability of water of
adequate quality from the Green River, Utah demanded and received
500,000 acre-feet annually from the Yampa River in Colorado. For
this water to be effectively used in Utah, a dam at Echo Park would
be necessary. Thus, the proposed Echo Park proposal became in
effect a part of the Compact. Since Indian rights were unquantified,
and no one was prepared to quantify them, it was impossible to
allocate those rights.
Agreement on the Compact was obtained without difficulty from
the legislatures of the four compacting states and thus the way was
cleared for development of a project proposal by the Bureau of
Reclamation. The Bureau endeavored to work very closely with the
water development agencies of each of the four states and with the
Compact-created Upper Colorado River Commission. In fact, the
states for the most part established their priorities with respect to
projects and the Bureau endeavored to develop a plan which would
accommodate their preferences. As expressed by a Bureau official at
a meeting of the Commission,
After all, the Bureau is in the position of asking you states to help
us. Sometimes we admit we are [not?] all-powerful, but down deep
in our hearts we know we are not all-wise, either. We want your
recommendations. [To the New Mexico representative] If you think

Martinez should be there, don't be bashful. 8
Bashful they were not, but their assertiveness depended very much
on their ability to reconcile sometimes serious differences within
their own states. It was one thing to obtain agreement on general
outlines of water allocations among states, particularly for the purpose of getting federal support, but it was quite another thing to get
agreement on within-state allocations of those waters. Transbasin
diversions provided a principal focus for these conflicts. In Utah, the
controversy concerned diversions from the Green River system to
Central Utah and the impact of such diversions on irrigation development in the eastern portion of the state. In Colorado, the conflict
concerned the interest of the city of Denver in obtaining an additional supply of water from the Blue River in the Colorado River
system; controversy over the Fryingpan-Arkansas project; and
8. Upper Colo. River Comm'n, 1 Official Record 57 (Meeting No. 3, Oct. 29, 1949).
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disputes over the location and size of a dam and reservoir on the
Gunnison River, the Curecanti Unit. In New Mexico, the debate
concerned the proposed diversion of water from the San Juan River
to the Rio Grande system for purposes of supplying it to developing
municipal and industrial interests in Albuquerque. Resolution of
these conflicts was imperative if Upper Basin interests were to obtain
consideration of their basic proposal for basinwide development.
Congress, and particularly the House Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee, took a dim view of projects on which local support was
not close to unanimous. Governor Thornton of Colorado put it this
way:
Thus, we are at the crossroads. Is Colorado to act as a unit in
supporting a program which will be fair and equitable to all areas in
the State, or is Colorado to have dissension with each region seeking
only that which appears to favor it the most .... Our future is at
stake. I have great fear as to our success in securing any one of these
projects which I have mentioned9 in the event there is substantial
opposition from within Colorado.

In the short space provided here it is impossible to provide a
detailed history of the specific compromises reached within each
state. There was intense bargaining in each state and among the
states, with the Bureau of Reclamation nurturing agreement by factgathering and analysis. The concerns of Eastern Utah were met by
the agreement on the waters of the Yampa. The debates within
Colorado continued for several years, resulting in: (1) a court suit,' 0
the result of which was ultimately recognized by Congress,'' allowing Denver to obtain a quantity of water from the Blue River; (2) a
decade-long controversy within Colorado and in Congress over
Fryingpan-Arkansas with its ultimate approval in 1962; 1 2 (3) reduction in size of the Curecanti Unit and recalculation of the benefit-cost
ratio to make it a feasible project for inclusion in the Colorado River
Storage Project; and (4) a sharing of shortage formula in New Mexico
which gave recognition to the in-basin and out-of-basin interests in
the waters of the San Juan River.' ' None of these agreements came
easily, and some of them were still being negotiated when Congress
took up the Storage Project in 1954.
9. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 1973 Minutes of Meetings 94 (Meeting No. 60, Feb.
16-17, 1953).
10. United States v. Northern Colo. Conservancy Dist., Civil Nos. 2782, 5016, 5017
(D.C. Colo. 1955) (unreported decree).
11. 43 U.S.C. § 620j (1970).

12. 43 U.S.C. § § 616-616f (1970).
13. See 43 U.S.C. § 620a (1970).
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C. The Conflict Over Echo Park
Inclusion of the proposed dam at Echo Park made a major struggle
with conservationist groups inevitable. However much the Upper
Basin spokesmen might insist that Echo Park was the "piston" that
drove the engine of the Project, however much they might argue that
Echo Park was the most economical part of the Project, both from a
monetary and an evaporation standpoint, however much they might
argue about its positive benefits for recreation and fishing, the conservationists would have none of it. This was regulatory politics in its
classic mold: two major combatants linked in combat with little or
no possibility of compromise on the principal issue or of disaggregating the benefits. The major conservation organizations took
up the invasion of the Dinosaur National Monument as an attempt to
violate holy ground, and, while they might register skepticism concerning the economic feasibility of the project, their outright opposition and national campaign was aimed at total elimination of any
works of man in the Monument.
It was not as though no effort was made to find some way out.
When the first outlines of the proposed project became known in
1949, both the proponents and the conservationists saw the conflict
coming. By 1950 it had resulted in a formal hearing conducted by
the Secretary of the Interior.' 4 Secretary Oscar Chapman, a highly
political official who liked compromises and not battles, temporized,
vacillated, seemingly reversed himself, and finally got out of the
controversy by getting out of his job when the Eisenhower Administration took office in 1953. Meanwhile, delegations from the Upper
Basin states and members of Congress from that region kept up a
drum beat of public and private pressure on the Department of the
Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation to move the project onto the
legislative calendar. It was only after a new leadership group entered
Interior and the Under Secretary of the Interior made a specific
study of the Echo Park question that the Administration became
fully committed to that project and supported its inclusion in legislation introduced into Congress.
The intensity of the opposition by the conservationists reflected
their protective concern for Echo Park but also their concern for the
sanctity of national parks. The invasion of the Monument, if successful, was considered a harbinger of future invasions when the magical
goal of economic development was used as justification. The specter
14. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Transcript of Proceedings in the Matter of Dinosaur National
Monument: Echo Park & Split Mountain Dams (1950).
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of Hetch Hetchy" s was trotted out regularly as a horrible example of
what might happen. The battle to save Echo Park became the struggle of the generation to save a part of America's hallowed heritage.
D. Opposition on Other Grounds
Leaving the Echo Park controversy aside, the Upper Basin Storage
Project as a system of storage and power dams, combined with a
series of irrigation projects in the Upper Basin, encountered little or
no opposition. The opposition it did receive came primarily from
California and on quite other grounds. One might have expected a
project costing inevitably well over $1 billion to encounter some very
heavy weather simply because of its fiscal impact and the amounts of
subsidy required. Certainly there were those who raised those questions-most notably Raymond Money in the popular press-but it
cannot be said that the project was seriously in danger at any time
because of its economic features. The issues were there-interest-free
money, low interest rates in calculating costs and benefits, use of
power revenues to subsidize irrigation projects that could not possibly sustain themselves without a subsidy, questionable benefit-cost
ratios, long pay-out periods, opportunity costs in using the money
for this kind of investment, value of the land'after development,
costs per acre for development-and, although they were raised, few
appeared to take the issues seriously as the bases on which a decision
should be made. The only spirited attack on the economics of the
Project was made by Senator Paul Douglas in floor debate, and it
appears that the effect was negligible.' 6
The reason seems clear: irrigation projects financed by federal
funds were part of the "expected" or "accepted" output of the
political system. As other areas received assistance in the development of inland waterways, or in agricultural subsidies, or in military
bases and defense contracts, the West received its due in the form of
irrigation projects. In addition, there remained an aura about irrigation as an almost mystical technological and sociological process
that led to economic development, to the opening up of the frontier,
to further opportunities for the small farmer. Finally, it may be
argued that water projects in general, whether in the West or the
East, have been a kind of common currency in politics. Support for
water projects in one area would be traded for support for water
projects in another area. Or they could be traded for votes on issues
wholly unrelated to water projects. Thus, an attack on one of these
15. For a brief account of the Hetch Hetchy controversy, see 14 Natural Resources J.
431,440-41 (1974). [Ed.]
16. 101 Cong. Rec. 4573 (1955).
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projects invited an attack on all of them, and such a battle was to be
avoided at all costs.
Southern California interests and members of Congress from
Southern California were dedicated opponents of the Storage
Project. Their opposition was clearly self-interested and the stubbornness of their opposition may have been too extreme to have
much credibility. Moreover, they were fighting against a sense of
equity for the various parts of the Colorado Basin. There was strong
feeling in the Upper Basin that Southern California had profited
enormously from federal assistance in the construction of Hoover
Dam and that it was now the Upper Basin's "turn." Whatever the
justice or the merits of the position from which Southern California
argued, its principal goal was to buy time. Every year that they could
delay the development of the Project was an additional year that
Southern California interests could enjoy the benefits of waters that
were arguably the legal entitlement of the Upper Basin States.
The legal claims of California were numerous and cannot detain us
long here. They were being fought out in the courts in the case then
pending before the Supreme Court, Arizona v. California.The issues
concerned both the interpretation of the Colorado River Compact
and the significance of contracts entered into by the Secretary of the
Interior with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
and other public agencies for the delivery of water. Southern California argued that Congress should make no decisions on questionable legal assumptions regarding entitlements to water. The arguments fell substantially on deaf ears because the Upper Basin could
rather convincingly demonstrate that the Storage Project being considered by Congress could not possibly interfere with established
California rights even with their most expansive definition. The
ultimate resolution of this legal battle came in the 1963 decision of
and
the Supreme Court in which it generally found against California
17
imposed more severe limits on its use of Colorado River water.
E. The Role of Presidents
Presidents do not often play important roles in water resource
development policy, partially because they have other duties of
higher priority, but usually because they recognize that if they are
opposed to a given project or set of projects, their opposition may be
overriden by a Congress and a group of nominally subordinate agencies, both of which jealously guard this realm of so-called "pork." As
Harold Ickes so characteristically expressed it with regard to the
17. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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Army Corps of Engineers, it is "mutiny for the bounty."' ' It may
be noted that among the very few presidential vetoes overriden by
Congress in the last two decades, a substantial number have been on
water project bills.
On the other hand, if the President favors a project, his support
may be very influential indeed. President Truman appears to have
favored Upper Basin development, although his interest appeared to
correspond with pressures brought on him by Upper Basin members
of Congress who wanted support for the project as a means of bolstering their reelection campaigns. He did not appear to impose much
pressure on Secretary Chapman nor did he do much to restrain the
Bureau of the Budget in its efforts to impose greater economic
rationality in the evaluation of the project proposals. And in the
election campaign of 1952 he implied that all dam-building and
power and reclamation projects would come to an end if a Republican Administration came to power.' 9
President Eisenhower, on the other hand, gave strong support to
the Upper Basin Project. The reasons for this support are not entirely
clear, but a number of explanations seem reasonable. One is that he
simply shared the ethic of water resource development, perhaps
gained in his early life in Kansas. Another is that he recognized the
political importance of the Rocky Mountain States and the power
they represented in Congress in such men as Millikin, Johnson, and
Aspinall of Colorado, Anderson and Chavez of New Mexico, and
Watkins and Bennett of Utah. The Democrats plus Millikin were men
of vast experience and influence in the Senate and House and the
new Republicans were men upon whom Eisenhower would have to
depend in getting his legislative program through. Cementing this
support, although probably not instrumental in obtaining it, was
Senator Watkins' role in carrying the President's successful immigration legislation through the Senate and in helping to dispose of
the problem of Senator Joseph McCarthy through the censure recommendation that came out of his select committee.
Whatever the reasons, President Eisenhower removed the roadblock in the Bureau of the Budget and gave firm administrative
support at crucial stages in the legislative process. Notable in this
regard was his inclusion of a statement urging passage of the project
legislation in early 1956 as a part of his announcement that he would
run for a second term.
18. Ickes, Foreword to A. Maass, Muddy Waters at xiv (1951).
19. Remarks of President Truman, Dedication of Hungry Horse Dam, Sept. 1952, quoted
at 99 Cong. Rec. 7438 (1953).
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F The Role of Congress
The structure of Congress was receptive to presidential support.
The Interior Committees of each house were and are today primarily
Western committees; the Senate Committee almost exclusively so.
Approval in the Senate was an almost certainty because of the bias of
representation for the West in that body and the stature of the
Western members. Approval in the House was more problematical
both because the House Committee was torn by conflicts and
because the House is less responsive to a single geographical interest
than the Senate. On the House Committee were powerful spokesmen
for the opposition: Saylor of Pennsylvania who took up the conservationist cause and Hosmer of California who promoted the interests
of California.
The importance of Saylor and Hosmer, particularly the former, lay
in their ability to articulate for the other members of the House the
concerns they had about the legislation being considered. Moreover,
Saylor worked very carefully with the conservationists in their movement to broaden the arena of conflict beyond the ordinarily quiet
recesses of the House Interior Committee. Thus, at crucial times it
became painfully apparent to the proponents that the Upper Colorado Storage Project bill would not pass the House of Representatives if it contained a dam at Echo Park. The Committee was
therefore faced with the options of removing Echo Park from the bill
in Committee and thus facilitating its passage by the House, or
reporting it with Echo Park and either having Echo Park stricken on
the floor or seeing the entire bill go down in defeat.
G. Consideration in Congress
The fragile agreement put together by the Bureau of Reclamation
and the Upper Basin States called for the authorization of two major
power and storage dams-Glen Canyon and Echo Park-and authorization of 12 irrigation projects which were called participating
projects. 2 Glen Canyon Dam was the so-called "cash register" of
the entire project in that it would produce the greatest proportion of
revenue, a considerable portion of which would be used to pay off
the costs of the irrigation projects. The latter, taken together, would
pay only approximately 12 percent of the costs of their own development. Thus, the purchasers of power would subsidize the irrigation
projects. Of the 12 participating projects, the largest by far was the
Central Utah Project which would require 74 percent of the funds
20. The Administration proposal was actually made known after the House hearings had
begun. The House had already before it bills sponsored by Upper Basin interests.
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authorized for irrigation projects. Water would be supplied to
143,360 acres of new land and as a supplement to 242,930 acres
already under irrigation.
That none of the proponents was entirely satisfied with the
Administration's proposal is indicated by the introduction, with
Upper Colorado River Basin support, of legislation that would have
authorized several more dams and irrigation projects.2 1 Altogether,
the Bureau had identified ten power dams in the Upper Basin, and
there were a host of other potential irrigation sites that would have
to be developed later.
In 1954 and 1955 lengthy hearings were held on the various legislative proposals.2 2 Extensive testimony was taken from the proponents, Upper Basin people who remained unreconciled with the
original proposal, conservationists, spokesmen for California, and
even a critic from the Hoover Commission that questioned the
economics of the Project. It cannot be said that many minds were
changed in the process, although the ranking Democrat on the House
Interior Committee, Clair Engle, did finally become a convert. One
suspects his conversion was in part a willingness to see the Upper
Basin use their water as they saw fit but in larger part a reflection of
the fact that he was interested in getting votes for the Trinity Project
in Northern California.
Evidence obtained from those participating in the legislative phase
of the effort to pass the Storage Act indicates that they put on an
intensive and extensive propaganda and lobbying campaign to gain its
passage. The effort was coordinated through the Upper Colorado
River Commission with Ival Goslin serving as the chief of staff and
working under the direction of Congressman Wayne Aspinall and a
small committee of Upper Basin legislators.
Within Congress, it appears that key legislators such as Dennis
Chavez, a power on the Senate Appropriations Committee, used their
muscle to get favorable votes. By reminders of past favors and future
needs, they were able to convince otherwise neutral or perhaps
mildly negative colleagues of the merits of the Project. It is difficult
to say how many votes were won in this way, but it is clear that
Upper Basin found this legislation of such vital importance that they
spent their political capital profligately to obtain a favorable result.
Similarly, outside of Congress, individuals from the Upper Basin
21. H.R. 4443, H.R. 4449, H.R. 4463, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
22. Hearings on the Colorado River Storage Project Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation &
Reclamation of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1954-55); Hearing on the Colorado River Storage Project Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation & Reclamation of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1954-55).
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who had contacts with political and economic interests outside the
Basin were asked to intervene in behalf of the Project. Delegations
were sent on forays into other parts of the country in search of
constituencies that could influence their legislators. Again, the results
of such tactics are uncertain but the proponents were convinced both
of the necessity of trying and of the marginal success of their efforts.
H. ContinuingInternalDissent
While the major focus of conflict was the controversy over Echo
Park, continuing dissatisfaction in Colorado provoked a serious
rupture in the united front the Upper Basin was striving to maintain.
Former Senator and then Governor "Big Ed" Johnson vigorously
attacked the Administration bill for its failure to give Colorado its
due in terms of projects and expenditures. 2 3 He found the building
of Glen Canyon Dam of little benefit to Colorado since it supplied
no water and little revenue for the state's few projects. He insisted
that serious consideration be given to the inclusion of a long list of
projects that he believed justified authorization. The fact that they
had not been adequately investigated by the Bureau of Reclamation
only increased the sense of outrage that he and his fellow Coloradans
felt at the way they were being treated in the legislation before
Congress. He argued that Colorado might be better off seeking
authorization for individual projects, rather than participating in an
inequitable basinwide arrangement.
It may well be that Governor Johnson's well-advertised attack on
the Administration's proposal was little more than a ploy to dramatize Colorado's long-term interest in getting additional funding.
Certainly he was bought off rather inexpensively through the device
of adding a large number of priority planning projects to the legislation. 2 4 These were nothing more than statements in the legislation
that these projects-then little more than a gleam in someone's eyeshould be given priority in future investigations.
But this mild protest took on more serious proportions toward the
end of 1955 when it appeared that final passage was in the offing.
Governor Johnson then contended that the power revenues derived
from the Project be distributed to each state in accordance with a
formula based on the allocations of water under the Colorado River
Compact. Since Colorado received 51 percent of the water, he maintained, Colorado should get 51 percent of the funds. This position
23. Hearingson the Colorado River Storage Project Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation&
Reclamation of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 824
(1954-55).
24. Colorado River Storage Project Act § 2, 43 U.S.C. § 620a (1970).
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clearly threatened to wreck the entire basin project since there would
not be enough money left over to finance projects in other states.
This was a particular threat to New Mexico and the Navajo Project
which would take a very sizable amount of Colorado River Storage
Project revenue. There ensued an intense period of negotiation in
which Ival Goslin, the Executive Secretary of the Upper Colorado
Commission, played a crucial role, the result of which was an agreement on the part of the four Upper Basin States that the power
revenues would be distributed according to the following formula:
Colorado
Utah
New Mexico
Wyoming

46%
21.5%
17%
15.5%

And, by a marvelous maneuver, the cost of Navajo Dam was made
completely nonreimbursable, i.e., a charge completely on the federal
treasury. These Santa Fe accords demonstrated the intensity of the
feeling that some accommodation had to be made in the quest for a
project and the fundamental bargaining nature of the political system
by which such accommodations are achieved.
I. The Price Tag
One of the concerns of the proponents was that the price tag of
the Project would scare away many potential supporters. Some early
versions of the Project legislation clearly carried a billion dollar plus
price tag and opponents such as Senator Paul Douglas made much of
this allegedly exorbitant cost.2 I One way to avoid such a high figure
was to exclude participating projects and storage and power dams
that would run up the cost. Another way was simply to pare down
the authorized expenditure figure, counting on the fact that later
Congresses would feel compelled to increase the authorization. The
administration had recommended a bill which would authorize an
expenditure of $950,000,000.26 The figure finally arrived at, in the
last instance by simply reducing by 10 percent the estimated cost
and not including funds for the Curecanti Unit, was $760,000,000.
J. The Elimination of Echo Park and Final Passage
The principal stumbling block-Echo Park-impeded action in the
House of Representatives for two full years. In 1954, the House
Interior Committee reported a bill with Echo Park in it by a vote of
25. 101 Cong. Rec. 4573 (1955).
26. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Reclamation Project Feasibility
and Authorization 188 (Supp. 1968).
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13-12, but it died in the House Rules Committee because Interior
Committee sponsors recognized that it was unlikely to pass if it came
up for debate. The Senate, after its Interior Committee had reported
a bill by a margin of 13-1, simply deferred further consideration in
view of the House difficulties. In 1955, the Senate passed the bill by
a vote of 58-30 after defeating an amendment to delete Echo Park by
a vote of 52-30.2 In the House of Representatives, the Committee
remained in serious conflict. The deadlock was broken when Congressman Wayne Aspinall, upon being advised by Ival Goslin that no
bill with Echo Park in it would pass the House, moved its deletion.
This was approved by a vote of 14-8 in the Subcommittee and ratified by the full Committee. Once again the bill was before the House
Rules Committee but again debate was postponed because of uncertainties regarding the revenue allocation formula noted above and
conservationist concern that any decision to delete Echo Park in the
House be reversed in the process of negotiation with the Senate in
the conference committee.
The conservationists remained intransigent on Echo Park and it
was the proponents who finally gave way. Leading figures in the
Upper Basin-senators, members of the House, governors, and
members of the Upper Colorado River Commission-met in Denver
in November 1955. Greeting them that fall day was a full page advertisement in the Denver Post paid for by the Council of Conservationists who had conducted an effective national lobbying and
advertising campaign against the bill with Echo Park in it.2 The
advertisement stated, "May we have it clearly understood, once and
for all that the conservationists who have been leading this battle are
NOT anti-reclamationists, and are NOT fighting the principle of
water use in the West?" The conservationists then pointed out the
economic weaknesses of the project bill and implicitly threatened to
broaden their attack if their demands that Echo Park be deleted were
not heeded.
The supporters at last realized what Congressman Aspinall had
long recognized: that Echo Park was dead. They agreed to its permanent deletion and also approved language that would protect Rainbow Bridge National Monument and would prevent authorization of
any project that would invade a national park or monument. In an
exchange of correspondence between the Council of Conservationists
and Senator Clinton Anderson the agreement was made firm and the
27. 101 Cong. Rec. 4806 (1955).
28. Reprinted in News Items of Interest, 1955 The Living Wilderness 24 (Winter/Spring

1955-56).
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Council complimented the Upper Basin proponents upon the adoption of the broader protective language.
With these compromises achieved, the final resolution of the conflict was no longer seriously in doubt. There remained irreconcilables
from California and those who disliked supporting irrigation agriculture with public subsidies, but these were insufficient in number
to constitute a substantial challenge. Legislative leadership of both
parties gave their support to the modified bill and it passed the
House of Representatives on March 1, 1956 by a margin of 256-136.
Differences of a rather substantial nature were subsequently resolved
by a conference committee and the conference report was approved
by both houses on March 28 and signed by President Eisenhower on
April 11, 1956.
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
As controversial as the Colorado River Storage Project was, upon
passage it quickly became settled policy, and it moved forward
rapidly into the detailed planning and construction phase. By 1963
Lake Powell was completed and, upon reaching an adequate storage
level in September 1964, began producing power and power revenue
for the remainder of the Project elements. Progress on other participating projects also took place. Flaming Gorge was completed somewhat earlier and produced its first power in November 1963.
Without conservation or environmental issues to catalyze opposition to water development, the legislation proposed subsequent to
the passage of the Colorado River Storage Project Act passed with
almost no opposition. The accepted ethic of water development and
federal financial support for it in the West dominated the proceedings so that opposition was effectively muted. In the case of
water development for the Indians, there was recognized a special
obligation to contribute to their economic well-being by exclusively
federal funding which, at the same time, continued to preserve
precious Upper Basin development funds for projects in non-Indian
areas.
A. San Juan-Chama and Navajo Projects
State and local groups that had not obtained authorization of their
projects in the original legislation continued to press their claims for
consideration on the Bureau of Reclamation and on Congress. In
1962 the long negotiations over the waters of the San Juan River
bore fruit with the passage of legislation authorizing over $220
million for the construction of the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project
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and the San Juan-Chama Diversion Project.2 The $135 million for
the Navajo irrigation project would be nonreimbursable to the federal treasury while the $85 million for the San Juan-Chama project
would be largely reimbursable from municipal and industrial users.
Whatever opposition remained after inter-basin conflicts had been
resolved within New Mexico had principally to do with the economics of the projects, but this opposition was relatively mild and
final passage in each house was by a voice vote.3 0
B. Fryingpan-Arkansas
Eastern slope interests in Colorado continued to seek passage of
the Fryingpan-Arkansas project which would bring Colorado River
system water into the Arkansas River system. Since the Fryingpan is
a tributary of the Colorado River, transmountain diversions raised
issues for western slope interests and for interests as far removed as
California because of the increasing burden being placed on the quantities of water in the Colorado River and because of the threats to
water quality. Nevertheless, by 1962, the legislation was passed
essentially because eastern and western slopes were able to resolve
their differences by means of a "sweetener," to use Congressman
Hosmer's term, for western slope interests in the form of authorization of Ruedi Dam and the prospect of developing an irrigation
project at Basalt. Moreover, strong Republican states in the West
overcame conservative opposition. CongressionalQuarterly reported
that when the House Rules Committee first considered the bill, it
was rejected by a vote of 6-8 with the Republican members voting
solidly against it. But when Republican incumbents from the Western
States, Western Republican candidates for the Congress and Western
Republican governors brought pressure on the Republican leadership,
the five negative Republican votes on the Rules Committee switched
to "yea."'
Once the sweetener was agreed upon, the project was
approved in both houses by voice votes.3 2
C. Three Colorado Projects
In 1964, three additional projects were brought before Congress,
the Savery-Pot Hook, Bostwick Park, and Fruitland Mesa projects.
The first is on the Colorado-Wyoming border and the other two are
in Colorado. The hearings reveal virtually no opposition to the
projects except an occasional reference to the costs and the benefits
29.
30.
31.
32.

43 U.S.C. § § 615ii-615yy (1970).
For a summary of action on this bill, see 18 Cong. Q. Almanac 469 (1962).
For a summary of action on this bill, see id., at 472.
Id
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forthcoming. Those opposed to the economic features of the projects
probably sympathized with an expression of Representative James
Haley of Florida who at one point in the hearings on these projects
stated:
Mr. Chairman, I see no use of continuing these hearings. Apparently
any information or data that you might gather here is just a waste of
time; and we can save the reporter's time and go on with some other
project, and let them vote them all out and make no record. The
committee has made
up its mind and it is a useless gesture here in
3
going through it.3
These projects passed both houses of Congress by voice vote and
with very little vocal opposition.3 4
D. Colorado Basin ProjectAct
Upper Basin interests were also deeply involved in the major water
resource controversy of the 1960's: the battle over the Central
Arizona Project (CAP). In general terms, it may be said that the
Upper Basin States supported Arizona in its quest for authorization
of the CAP. Arizona had long given its aid to the Upper Basin States,
and the latter's support was expected payment on the debt.
The focus of this legislation was on proposed dams above and
below the Grand Canyon. These dams were to provide the revenue to
finance the CAP and the power to pump the water into the Central
Arizona area. The conservationists, as with Echo Park, would have
none of either dam. Marble Canyon Dam would reduce the flow of
the Colorado River within the Grand Canyon substantially and thus
reduce the quality of the experience in seeing the agent that created
the Grand Canyon. Bridge Canyon Dam would back water up
through the Grand Canyon National Monument and into the national
park.
While this battle was being fought vigorously both in Congress and
in the national media, and while various compromises were being
struck which would permit the authorization of CAP, Upper Basin
legislators were quietly obtaining additional projects for themselves.
It may almost be stated that the price of support of CAP on the part
of the powerful legislators such as Wayne Aspinall and Clinton
Anderson was approval of the projects they were sponsoring.' s Colo33. Hearingson H.R. 3672 & H.R. 3771 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation& Reclafmation of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 142
(1964).
34. For a summary of action on this bill, see, 20 Cong. Q. Almanac 501 (1964).
35. See H. Ingram, Patterns of Politics in Water Resources Development: A Case Study
of New Mexico's Role in the Colorado River Basin Bill (1969).
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rado obtained authorization of five projects, some of which had not
even been approved by the Bureau of the Budget. New Mexico got
Hooker Dam. Utah got conditional authorization for another unit of
the Central Utah Project and reauthorization (with more money) for
the Dixie Project in the Lower Basin. It may be recalled how grievously wounded Colorado felt in getting so few projects out of the
original Colorado River Storage Project. As described by a contemporary observer, it was literally, "You vote for my project and
I'll vote for yours."'3 6 And, as Helen Ingram wrote in describing this
legislative battle, no questions of principle-such as priorities, costs,
direction of development-could be raised because "to raise such an
issue was to threaten the cohesion which made negotiation among
different power centers possible at all." '3
E. The Upper Basin Today
Many of the storage and power units and the participating projects
are now completed while a number yet remain under construction or
in the planning stage. Tables I and II give some relevant information
TABLE I
Storage Units-Colorado River Storage Project-as of June 30, 1972
Cost
Unit
Curecanti
Flaming Gorge
Glen Canyon
Navajo

State

Ultimate

Originally
Authorized
(millions)

Total Cost
(estimated)
(millions)

88.6
83.1
421.0
36.6

153.5
74.9
297.9
42.4

Colorado
Utah-Wyoming
Arizona-Utah
New Mexico

Power

Plant
Generated
Capacity
F. Y. 1972
(KW) (KWH millions)
208,000
108,000
950,000
-

599
676
3,799
-

about the Project as of the end of fiscal year 1972. Of the presently
authorized storage units, only the Curecanti is not yet fully developed, with the third unit, Crystal, not yet under construction. A
number of participating projects, especially those authorized by the
Colorado River Basin Act, 3" are not yet under construction and
two-Dallas Creek and Savory-Pot Hook-have been deferred. The
Pine River project was deauthorized in 1968.
As an exercise in distributive politics, the Project has some interesting features. In terms of money spent and size of project, Utah has
clearly received the better of it. The Bonneville Unit receives the
36. See 24 Cong. Q. Almanac 813 (1968).
37. Ingram, supra note 35, at 37.

38. 43 U.S.C § § 1501-1556 (1970).
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TABLE II
Participating Projects-Colorado River Storage Project-as of June 30, 1972

Project
Bostwick Park
Bonneville Unit
Jensen Unit
Vernal Unit
Eden
Emery Co.
Florida
Fruitland Mesa
Hammond
Lyman
Navajo Indian
Irrigation

Paonia
Pine River

State

Reimbursed Average
Cost
Originally Total Cost by UCRBF (1) Crop
PrinAuthorized (estimated) (ultimate) Value/acre cipal
(millions) (millions)
(millions)
(FY 1971) Crop

Colorado
Utah
Utah
Utah
Wyoming
Utah
Colorado
Colorado
New Mexico
Wyoming-Utah

3.850
219.511
1.787
7.048
2.445
9.883
6.964
27.185
2.310
10.624

9.057
456.605
11.601
10.174
11.220
15.662
11.273
40.776
7.205
16.944

New Mexico

135.000

207.500

6.954
3.240

8.229
3.468

Colorado
Colorado

5.706
141.076
2.177
7.409
9.628
9.131
7.679,
33.845
6.303
11.908

93.92

forage
forage

--

86.50
39.75
76.90
96.20
(2)
133.99
(2)

..

..

5.209
(3)

145.66
56.99

San Juan-Chama

New Mexico

85.428

92.211

..

..

Seedskadee
Silt
Smith Fork

Wyoming
Colorado
Colorado

23.671
3.373
3.439

59.292
7.883
4.706

39.672
6.102
3.203

--

119.06
68.35

Dallas Creek
Savory-Pot Hook

Colorado
Colorado-

Deferred
Deferred

..

..

forage
forage
forage
forage
forage
forage
forage
forage
forage
forage
.

- -..

..

..

Wyoming
(1) Upper Colorado River Basin Fund
(2) Under Construction
(3) Deauthorized 1968
Information derived from Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Water and
Land Resource Accomplishments: Federal Reclamation Projects, Project Data, Statistical
App. 1 & 3 (1972).

largest chunk of power revenue, although proportionate to the cost
of the entire unit it receives less than others, principally because the
unit produces its own power which it applies to the cost of the unit.
The two major projects in New Mexico impose substantial burdens
on the federal treasury, but the Navajo Irrigation Project is entirely
nonreimbursable. Colorado has the largest number of projects, but
they are all relatively modest in size.
Another notable feature of the Project is the extent to which the
costs of the developed unit exceed the estimated cost at the time of
authorization. The reasons for this are numerous: Changes in the
design of the project once the detailed planning is undertaken; inflation over the period of planning and construction; and unexpected
problems such as drainage difficulties. It is difficult to judge the
frequently heard accusation that the Bureau of Reclamation delib-
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erately underestimates the cost of projects, but the evidence is clear
that it has consistently underestimated costs in the Colorado River
Storage Project, and sometimes by factors of more than 2.
The statistics indicate the extent to which each project relies on
the power revenues to pay off the reimbursable costs, particularly
those allocated to irrigation. The proportion varies from project to
project, but in virtually every case it is substantial except where a
large proportion of the cost can be charged to minicipal and industrial use. This will be particularly the case with the San Juan-Chama
Project which will supply a large block of water for Albuquerque.
The average crop value per acre is relatively low, even by reclamation standards. Only three of the projects for which figures are
available have average crop values over $100 per acre. The low crop
values are of course related to the fact that the principal cropsalmost the exclusive crops-grown on the participating units are
forage crops. The utilization of scarce water for such low-value purposes raises important questions regarding future use of that water
when higher value uses begin to be more readily available. The likelihood of transfers of use will depend on the flexibility of the legal
and administrative institutions to accomplish those transfers.
F What of the Future?
The basically distributive character of Upper Colorado River Basin
water politics seems amply demonstrated by the historical record.
Only when a major conservation battle develops does water policy
enter the regulatory arena. In the two cases cited-Echo Park and
Grand Canyon-the conservationists have won on the specific issue in
controversy. But the price of winning may well have been acquiescence in distributive politics that is the very antithesis of planning
and ecological concern. One leading defender of the environment,
David Brower, was known to lament a considerable time after his
victory on Echo Park, that the conservationists had given away unnecessarily one of the great natural wonders of the United States
-Glen Canyon.
When these conservation issues were not present, those espousing
water development for economic benefit to the various localities of
the West have been able to succeed with little more than token
opposition from outside the region. The only limiting condition has
been lack of agreement within the region. Once those disagreements
have been resolved, the authorizing legislation has been readily obtained.
The question remaining concerns the future: Will battles over
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water development continue to be fought in the distributive arena or
will the issues come forth in a regulatory or redistributive arena?
Several interrelated questions involving the entire Colorado River
Basin suggest both the persistence of the distributive mode of problem solving and the manner in which regulatory and redistributive
modes may intrude.
The recency of the 1968 Colorado River legislation and the water
pollution control legislation of 1972 suggests in itself the lasting
power of the distributive style of politics dealing with water policy in
the United States. But other characteristics of the 1968 legislation, in
particular, lend credence to the view that, while distributive politics
in the water field will persist, it may be on a somewhat altered basis.
One of the important provisions of the Colorado River Basin
Project was that the States of the Colorado River Basin in the United
States would be relieved of the obligation of supplying water to
Mexico under the Mexican Water Treaty of 1944." The Act declares
"that the satisfaction of the requirements of the Mexican Water
Treaty from the Colorado River constitutes a national obligation.... " This provision was tied to language in the Act which
authorized investigations of water supplies of the Western United
States for the purpose of increasing the available water. The Colorado River itself would continue to supply water to Mexico under
the terms of the Colorado River Compact and Mexican Water Treaty
until such a time as the lower Colorado Basin received a new supply
of 2.5 million acre-feet.
By the terms of the Colorado River Compact of 1922 and the
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 the waters of the Colorado
River were divided between the two basins, with the dividing point at
Lee Ferry, Arizona, just below the present site of Glen Canyon Dam.
In the event that the United States agreed to recognize rights on the
part of Mexico to waters of the Colorado, the water supplied Mexico
was to come from surplus; if no surplus existed, then each part of the
basin would meet half of the burden.4 1 An agreement was consumated with Mexico in 1944, granting to that country 1.5 million acrefeet annually.4 2
The evidence is conclusive that the estimates made in 1922 of
water flows of the Colorado River were overoptimistic. Only once
39.
Rivers
1945)
40.
41.
42.

Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 944 (effective Nov. 8,
[hereinafter cited as 1944 Treaty with Mexico].
43 U.S.C. § 1512 (1970).
Colorado River Compact, art. 111(c), Nov. 24, 1922, 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 325 (1928).
1944 Treaty with Mexico.
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since 1933 has the 10-year moving average of virgin flows reached
the level of 15 million acre-feet on which the Colorado River Compact was based. From 1922 to 1968 the average virgin flow was only
13.8 million acre-feet. The states of the Colorado River Basin were
therefore faced with the burden of supplying water to Mexico out of
supplies apportioned to them by the Compact and in the lower basin,
at least, already in use. The answer, then, was to seek relief from this
obligation. This relief was supplied by means of the above provision
of the Colorado River Basin Project Act. How the United States will
meet this obligation remains unclear at this time. Interbasin transfers
and weather modification are frequently mentioned sources of increased water supply. What does seem clear is that the taxpayers and
the beneficiaries of the waters of the Colorado River in the Southwestern States will largely be relieved of their obligations, and the
taxpayers of the United States will assume them instead-distributive
politics with an international hitching post.
The two most frequently mentioned sources of additional water
raise other questions relating to distributive politics. The issue of
interbasin transfers was roundly debated at the time of the passage of
the Basin Project Act in 1968. Northwestern public officials, at the
state level and in Congress, vigorously opposed even the study of
interbasin transfers. Included in the Act was a provision that for the
period of ten years from the date of the Act, the Secretary of the
Interior could not undertake reconnaisance studies of any plan for
importation of water into the Colroado River Basin from any other
natural river drainage outside the Colorado River Basin States.4 In
partial compensation to the Southwest, a companion bill was passed
calling for the creation of a National Water Commission for the
purpose of studying water needs and consequences of water development for the quality of life of the American people. 4 4 Included in
the possible means of meeting water requirements in the United
States was interbasin transfers.
The National Water Commission has now issued a report which
must send chills up the spines of those who have played distributive
politics with Western water policy in the past. The Commission urges
the application of strict economic analysis in the evaluation of all
such proposals for interbasin transfers, i.e., that there be clear-cut
national economic gains and not simply income transfers and that the
beneficiaries pay the full reimbursable cost of the water brought to
their region, including compensation to the region that exports the
43. Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, 43 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970).
44. National Water Commission Act, 82 Stat. 868 (contained in note to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1962a (1970).
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water.4 I Given the fact that the adoption of such principles clearly
takes decisionmaking on water development projects completely outside the distributive framework, there is little expectation that any
projects would be authorized on that basis.4 6
Weather modification is in a transitional stage between basic research and applied science, and its actual policy dimensions remain
yet to be revealed. As a technique applicable to traditional reclamation policy, there will presumably be intense pressures to fit it within
the policy mold laid down and refined since 1902. As a means of
increasing the water supply of the Colorado River system and given
the fact that the obligation to Mexico is now a national one, there
would be strong incentives to write off the cost of public investment
at taxpayers' expense.
Examining alternative futures in terms of population growth, pricing policies, and technological development, the National Water
Commission concluded that it was unlikely that there would be outright water shortages for the nation as a whole or for the perennially
water-short West. But it admitted that there might be water shortages
in some areas.4 Politically speaking, however, it is the number and
relationship of those shortage areas that give rise to speculation
about a continuation of distributive politics on a much grander scale.
Numerous schemes for interbasin transfers have been discussed, costing as little as $1.2 billion and as much as $100 billion. They range
from taking one million acre-feet from the Snake River to the headwaters of the Colorado River to grandiose schemes that would bring
110,000,000 acre-feet from Canada under the so-called North American Water and Power Alliance proposal.4 The latter would bring
water from Northern Canada not only to the Southwest but also to
the Great Lakes and the Missouri-Mississippi Valleys.
Assuming it would be in Canadian interest-a very debatable point
which Canada alone would have to decide-the American side of the
proposal would involve the creation of a "Christmas tree" on which
45. National Water Commission, Water Policies for the Future 317-333 (1973).
46. The views of the National Water Commission may of course be entirely ignored by
decisionmakers in Congress and the executive branch. Congress may continue to authorize
on its traditional basis, emphasizing regional economic development as a justification for
doing so. But the Commission points the other way: "While water resources projects have
had very significant impacts on regional economic development and population distribution
in the past, their role in economic development diminished as a higher level of economic
development was attained." Id. at 39. Instead the Commission believed that water policy
should be used strategically to complement other public policies designed to meet public
needs of economic, environmental, and regional well-being.
47. Id
48. See R. Johnson, Law of Interbasin Transfers (1971); some are even more grandiose:
see Quinn, Continental Water Images: Past and Present (undated mimeo).
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urban water supply, pollution control, irrigation development, and
recreation would be the most notable ornaments. At least one Southwestern Congressman, who despaired of ever getting an interbasin
transfer strictly for the interests of his state, believed that when
much broader regional interests were at stake, such a program of
water transfer would be possible.4" The terms of such transfers
would of course have to be worked out, but the temptation for
distributive politics to be the mode would probably be overwhelming. Moreover, as in the cases cited previously, a bargain might
be struck between those who have some worthy environmental goal
in mind and those who seek federal funding for projects which would
facilitate the enactment of an entire package.
Another current illustration of the persistence of distributive
politics concerns water quality in the Colorado River system. The
"law of the river," consisting of compacts, statutes, treaties, and
court decisions is relatively silent on the question of water quality.
The Colorado River Storage Project Act calls only for the Secretary
of the Interior to undertake investigations of water quality. It appears that the negotiators for both the United States and Mexico
avoided the issue of water quality in the 1944 Treaty because both
parties wanted the Treaty and neither wanted to open up a subject
that was likely to bog the negotiations in a dispute that might last
several years. 5 0 The negotiators for the United States firmly disavowed any commitment on water quality in reporting to the Senate.' ' The negotiators for Mexico apparently had a different interpretation, believing that the United States had obligated itself to
deliver water to Mexico no different in quality from that delivered at
Imperial Dam just north of the border.' 2
The quality of the water in the Colorado River at the Mexican
border took a dramatic turn for the worse around 1961, apparently
related to completion of a drainage system on the Wellton-Mohawk
project in Arizona as well as to continued upstream development
generally. The Mexican government complained about severe damage
to its crops in the Mexicali Valley and vigorously asserted its rights to
49. D. Mann, Interbasin Water Transfers: A Political and Institutional Analysis 138
(1972).
50. See N. Hundley, Dividing The Waters: A Century of Controversy Between the United
States and Mexico (1966).
51. S. Exec. Rep. No. 2, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945);HearingsonTreaty With Mexico
Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7,107, 322-24, 331, 338 (1945).
52. Alba, Technical Report on the International Water Treaty, in E. Weinberg, "Salt
Talks" United States and Mexican Style: A Case Study of the Lower Colorado River
Salinity Dispute (Mimeo. 1973).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

water of quality equal to that delivered to Imperial Dam above the
border. The issue was the subject of several talks between U.S. and
Mexican presidents and lower level negotiators over the next decade.
Several temporary expedients were adopted, but they were recognized as palliatives rather than solutions. However, in June 1972
President Nixon appointed Herbert Brownell as his special representative to find a solution to the problem. After extended negotiations
with the Mexican Government, an agreement was announced on
August 30, 1973.' ' The agreement calls for reduction of the salinity
of Mexican water to just slightly over the salt content of water at
Imperial Dam. This is to be achieved by lining the first 50 miles of
the Coachella Canal that delivers water to the Coachella Valley in the
United States, building a $67 million desalting plant to treat WelltonMohawk drainage, constructing a canal to carry Wellton-Mohawk
drainage to the gulf of Mexico, and facilitating financing of rehabilitation work on Mexican land. The effect of these agreements would
be to offer Mexico essentially what it wished: complete substitution
of 200,000-220,000 acre-feet of water available from WelltonThe United States would bear full costs, esMohawk drainage."
timated to be at a minimum of $115 million for the entire package.' 5
In February 1973, after several years of legal, engineering, and
economic argument, the Federal District Court for Utah presented a
challenge to the traditional framework of decisionmaking. In the case
of Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong the court held that the Secretary of the Interior was obligated to prevent waters of Lake Powell
from entering into the boundaries of the Rainbow Bridge National
Monument.5 6 The decision was based on the provisions of the Colorado River Storage Project Act which obliged the Secretary to "take
adequate measures to preclude impairment of the Rainbow Bridge
National Monument" and expressed the intention of Congress "that
no dam or reservoir constructed under the authorization of this act
shall be within any national park or monument."' 7
The implications of this decision were serious and were taken
seriously by the Upper Basin States. A decision to limit the level of
Lake Powell would substantially impair carefully worked out arrangements for storage in Lake Powell which would allow the Upper
Basin to develop irrigation and other development projects while
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Los Angeles Times, Aug. 31, 1973, at 1.
Weinberg, supra note 52, at 38.
Los Angeles Times, Aug. 31, 1973, at 1.
Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 360 F. Supp. 165 (D.C. Utah 1973).
Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, 43 U.S.C. § 620b (1970).
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releasing water for satisfaction of the obligations to the Lower Basin
States and Mexico. Moreover, it threatened the economic life of the
Storage Project since the loss of power head would substantially
reduce power output and therefore the revenues to pay for the irrigation features of the Project.
The United States appealed the decision and won in the Circuit
Court of Appeals.' ' The Circuit Court held that Congress had impliedly repealed the provisions of the Colorado River Storage Project
Act by its repeated and explicit refusals to fund works "to prevent
waters of Lake Powell from entering any National Monument." It
noted that even when water was already in the Monument in 1972,
Congress included such a proviso in its appropriation for the Bureau
of Reclamation. The court contended that the intent of Congress was
that the storage of Lake Powell would be at design capacity rather
than half of that capacity, as would result from the district court's
decision. It also noted that legislative authorizations of projects had
occurred since 1956, all of which depended in some way on the
storage capacity at Lake Powell. Of particular importance was the
provision of the Colorado River Basin Act which required that the
storage levels of Lake Mead and Lake Powell be as close to parity as
possible.' I
Two judges dissented on grounds that the court was usurping the
power of Congress in removing a specific obligation created by Congress itself. The Supreme Court removed any doubt about the finality of the decision, at least from the courts themselves, by denying
certiorari in January 1974.60 Meanwhile, the water level of Lake
Powell continues to rise and fill the gorge under Rainbow Bridge.
Thus, the environmentalists lost an important battle for protection
of a natural area against the forces favoring development. While the
Circuit Court found legal bases for its decision, its decision also
clearly reflects a judgment that the overall needs of development
took priority over the need for protection of a natural wonder in its
pristine form. The costs of protection were deemed too great and the
impairment too slight to merit a different conclusion.
CONCLUSION

The norms of distributive politics dictate that individuals and
groups who seek some benefit from a public source create a united
front on their separable but common interests. They then obtain
58. Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973).
59. 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(3) (1970).
60. Friends of the Earth v. Stamm, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974).
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their benefit from the public source without appearing to impose any
burden on other interests in society. This may be, and usually is,
accomplished through appropriations of money and imposition of
the burden on the taxpayers. In water politics, at least, challenges
have come only when other major interests in society were able to
perceive damage to their interests. In the Colorado River Basin, these
challenges have come only over conservation and interregional issues.
It is clear that every effort is being made to continue policymaking in
this same mold, and the agreement on water quality at the Mexican
border is but one more attempt to do so.
No one is interested in taking on the tough questions. How will
the water supply of the Colorado River Basin be made adequate to
the needs and expectations of the various interests who clamor for
more? Will the needs require redefinition rather than the supply?
How are the needs to be determined? By some extrapolation of past
growth or by a mechanism that is based more on the principle that
those who want a resource more are willing to pay more? Should the
taxpayers be required to bail out the Southwest, and if so, why? And
to what extent? What evidence is there that the price tag attached to
the desalination and bypass program at the Mexican border will be
anything more than a guess? Are there not other alternatives that
may involve some sacrifice in the Southwest itself? Is every acre that
has been cultivated in the past deserving of cultivation in the future?
What are the limits of water quality degradation? Is the institutional
arrangement dividing the waters of the Colorado River between the
Upper and Lower Basins still a rational one? What incentives may
there be to consider an alteration in that arrangement?
These are questions that can be answered only by challenging the
present process of handling water supply and water quality questions
in the Southwest, i.e., by considering them in a regulatory framework. The Environmental Protection Agency has moved in this direction in its quest for water quality standards on the Colorado. The
courts have challenged this process in endeavoring to sort out environmental and developmental issues. But still the distributive mode
prevails. It now has an international hitching post with the MexicanUnited States agreement on the salinity problem.
What may happen is that the challenge to traditional modes of
decisionmaking will come from those concerned about redistributive
questions. It may be recognized eventually that the price tag on
distributive politics is simply too great, particularly in view of the
benefits that the nation receives. Presidential impoundments, higher
interest rates, and movements toward revenue sharing may place
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redistributive questions squarely before the policymakers and touch
off a serious concern about politics as usual in dealing with water
policy. The present signs, however, do not suggest a significant movement in that direction.

